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THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ABORTION IN
GERMANY: SHOULD AMERICANS PAY
ATTENTION?*
Donald P. Kommers**
What I plan to do here is to tell you the story of Germany's legal ap-
proach to abortion and offer some tentative conclusions about what we
Americans might learn from the German experience. My story centers
mainly on the constitutionality of efforts in Germany to remove legal re-
strictions on abortion. In the United States, the story has a different
twist, for there it centers on the constitutionality of efforts to impose legal
restrictions on abortion. Both stories are fascinating accounts of constitu-
tional decisionmaking, revealing as much about the values of the two so-
cieties as about the role of judicial review in a constitutional democracy.
The two stories unfold in the decisions, respectively, of the U.S. Supreme
Court and Germany's Federal Constitutional Court.
Before telling my story, however, I want to say a few words about com-
parative constitutional analysis, the kind of analysis I am about to embark
upon. The purpose of this article is not so much to find the right answer
to a constitutional problem, but rather to understand and distinguish the
competing conceptions of freedom and responsibility that undergird the
* This article has been adapted from the 1993 Brendan F. Brown Lecture.
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America, M.A., University of Wisconsin (Madison), Ph.D., University of Wisconsin
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abortion cases in the two countries. What makes comparison in this in-
stance so engaging is that two occidental, post-industrial, secular socie-
ties, presumably committed to liberty and justice for all, have embraced,
at least temporarily radically different constitutional positions on abor-
tion. More interesting still is that these divergent outcomes proceed from
humane values and constitutional principles common to, both societies.
The two stories are also contemporaneous. In 1973, the United States
Supreme Court struck down state laws interfering with a woman's right to
secure an abortion within the first and second trimesters of pregnancy.1
TWo years later, in 1975, Germany's Constitutional Court struck down an
abortion statute that sought to guarantee precisely the fundamental right
that the Supreme Court somehow managed to discover.2 Both decisions
were extraordinary assertions of judicial power. In fact, Justice White's
dissenting opinion in Doe v. Bolton, deploring what he called "an exercise
of raw judicial power,"3 found anequally strong echo in the German dis-
sents. As the German dissenters stated in 1975: "The-Federal Constitu-
tional Court must not succumb to the temptation to take over for itself
the [function of legislation and thus to] endanger the authority [of this
Court]."4 Despite these opinions and the commotion they created, both
courts, some twenty years later - the Supreme Court in 1992 and the
Constitutional Court in 1993 - preserved the essential core of each of
their original decisions.'
Before turning to Germany, I would like to say more about the value
of comparative constitutional analysis. Along with the English compara-
tivist, Basil S. Markesinis, I believe that foreign case law - here constitu-
tional case law - is an important resource in the study of comparative
law.6 Cases deal with concrete problems of liberty and order in a consti-
tutional democracy. Combining, as they often do, comedy and error with
tragedy and pathos, cases form the living skein of law. For Americans,
foreign constitutional cases are particularly important because they be-
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
2. Judgment of February 25, 1975, 39 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 1 (First Senate) (F.R.G.). For a complete translation of the 1975 German
Abortion Case, see Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A
Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 551, 605-84 (1976).
3. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
4. 39 BVerfGE at 70. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from this decision,
the abortion decision of 1993, and other official documents are those of the author.
5. See, respectively, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992); Judgment of May 28, 1993, 88 BVerfGE 203 (Second Senate).
6. Basil S. Markesinis, Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53
MOD. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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long to the literature of responsible freedom and limited government, a
literature that is both challenging and enlightening: challenging because it
forces Americans to confront cherished assumptions about themselves as
a people and the deeper meaning of their public values; enlightening be-
cause the opinions and insights of foreign case law uncover truths about
our own constitutional tradition that we may have only dimly perceived
in the past.7
Constitutional cases also invite our attention because, by comparing
cases handed down by different nations with constitutional tribunals simi-
lar to the United States Supreme Court, we can illuminate the process of
constitutional interpretation. In deciding cases, judges are called upon to
interpret a foundational text' and, in doing so, to draw a delicate line
between the poles of judicial supremacy and legislative majoritarianism.
American legal scholars currently tearing each other apart over ap-
proaches to judicial review and losing sleep at night agonizing over the
countermajoritarian difficulty may find more satisfying models of judicial
decisionmaking in other constitutional democracies. Finally, through
cases we can bring courts into conversation with one another, thereby
furnishing us with a window of understanding into the spirit of argument
about political foundations and the varying dimensions of freedom that
comport with liberal democracy. The office of comparative jurisprudence
is not simply to compare constitutional doctrines. Doctrinal description is
not, in my view, the heart of the comparative enterprise. Benjamin Car-
dozo's perspective is on the mark. What is important in understanding
judge-made law, he noted, is the "philosophy" behind doctrine that
"give[s] direction to thought and action."9 What gives direction to
thought and action in other societies like our own may move us to iden-
tify more clearly the ethos that drives our law. The comparative enter-
prise may not lead us to a new Jerusalem, nor is it likely to identify any
ideal relationship between the values of liberty and community, but it
may open our eyes to things we take for granted and encourage us to
reflect critically on those things.
In sum, comparative constitutional analysis is an instrument sharp
enough to remove the scales of parochialism from our eyes. It helps us to
7. See generally Donald P. Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law,
9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 685 (1976).
8. Germany's foundational text is known as the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of 23 May
1949 [hereinafter GGI. The terms "basic law" and "constitution" are used interchangeably
in this article.
9. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12 (1921).
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see the strengths and weaknesses of a given country's legal ideology and
to identify neglected issues and otherwise ignored questions. Listening to
the voices of foreign constitutional judges is one way of opening our
minds to larger vistas of constitutional argument and insight than may be
available in the corpus of a single nation's constitutional jurisprudence. It
is possible that we Americans would feel more confident about our own
constitutional values by drawing inspiration and knowledge from the
work of foreign constitutional courts.
I
For my purposes, Germany's story begins with the Abortion Reform
Act of 1974.10 Until then, the destruction of a human fetus was a punish-
able offense under section 218 of the Criminal Code," except when a
licensed physician aborted a fetus to remove a clear danger to the preg-
nant woman's life or health. Decades of debate over the criminalization
and punishment of abortion formed the backdrop to the 1974 statute.'
2
This statute's passage was one consequence of the 1972 national election
which sent Willy Brandt into the Chancellor's office on the crest of the
greatest victory of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in the postwar era.
Social reform marked Brandt's coalition government, and the Abortion
Reform Act of 1974 was part of its record. The Act passed after a fierce
legislative battle between the ruling coalition and Christian Democrats,'
3
the latter playing the still unfamiliar role of loyal opposition. The vote in
the German Bundestag was 247 in favor, 233 against, with 9 abstentions. 4
10. Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts (StrRG) of 18 June 1974, BUNDESGESETZBLATr
I [BGBL. 1] 1297 (F.R.G.).
11. Das erste Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts of 25 June 1969, §§ 218-19. The an-
cestry of these provisions can be traced back to §§ 181 and 182 of the Prussian Penal Code
of April 14, 1851. These provisions were later incorporated into the Penal Code for the
German Reich. See Strafgesetzbuch fUr das Deutsche Reich of 15 May 1871 (Reich-
sgesetzblatt at 127).
12. The Federal Constitutional Court's opinion contains a lengthy description of this
background. See 39 BVerfGE at 6-18. See also Albin Eser, Reform of German Abortion
Law: First Experiences, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 369 (1986); Michael Quass, COMP. L. Y.B. 41-
60 (1983).
13. See Donald P. Kommers, Abortion and Constitution: United States and West Ger-
many, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 255, 258-64 (1977). The reference here and elsewhere to Chris-
tian Democrats embraces members of two political parties, namely, the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU).
14. The German Bundestag or Federal Parliament consists of representatives "elected
in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections." GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG
art. 38, § 1 (F.R.G.). Whether the Abortion Reform Act required the consent of the Fed-
eral Council or Bundesrat, the high federal organ in which the states are corporately repre-
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The core issue in the parliamentary debate was whether to eliminate
the penalty for abortion in the early stages of pregnancy altogether - the
so-called "time-phase" solution - or to retain it throughout pregnancy
except when certain hazardous conditions specified by law are present -
known as an "indications solution." The Abortion Reform Act incorpo-
rated the time-phase solution with provisions for social assistance and
counseling. Under these provisions, a woman could choose to abort her
fetus within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, but only after consulting
a physician and a licensed counselor for information about public and
private support for pregnant women."5 After twelve weeks, a pregnant
woman could legally secure an abortion only for a certified medical ne-
cessity.16 She could also legally abort a fetus within twenty-two weeks,
again with proper certification, but only to avoid the birth of a seriously
defective child.' 7 Finally, the physician, not the woman, would feel the
law's sting since the doctor could not legally carry out an abortion within
the first twelve weeks unless the pregnant woman could produce a certifi-
cate showing that she had received proper medical and social counseling.
Immediately, Christian Democratic lawmakers and five states under
Christian Democratic rule petitioned the Constitutional Court for a rul-
ing on the constitutionality of the new law. In Germany, such petitioners
may invoke the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction without presenting a
case or controversy as required by American law.' a Under German law,
a state, or Land government, or one-third of the Bundestag's members
sented, was one of the issues before the Federal Constitutional Court. Under the Basic
Law, legislation affecting the administration of federal law by the states requires the con-
currence of the Bundesrat. In ruling that the Abortion Reform Act changed the substance
of federal law rather than its administration by the state, the Constitutional Court sus-
tained the Bundestag's refusal to seek the Bundesrat's concurrence. For a discussion of the
powers of the Bundesrat, see UWE THAYSEN, THE BUNDESRAT, THE LANDER AND GER-
MAN FEDERALISM (1994).
15. StRGR, § 218a.
16. Id. § 218b.
17. Id. § 218b(2).
18. Like European models of judicial review generally, Germany's scheme of judicial
review separates constitutional from ordinary litigation. The Constitutional Court decides
constitutional questions only, and it is the only tribunal empowered to declare laws uncon-
stitutional. In this system, questions arise under the Basic Law by means of various forms
of referral, either by courts of law or by high state officials. The purpose of such referrals is
not to settle a dispute between litigants, as in the United States, but rather to decide the
objective question presented and thus to clarify a doubt or disagreement in the political
system over the meaning of the Constitution. After exhausting their legal remedies, indi-
viduals may also petition the Court if they believe that one or more of their guaranteed
rights have been violated by the state. This procedure is known as a constitutional com-
plaint. While this extraordinary remedy affords individuals the opportunity to vindicate
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may test a statute's constitutionality in what is known as an "abstract ju-
dicial review" proceeding if doubts or disagreements exist about its con-
stitutionality. Crucial to the German Court's jurisdiction is the question
of the validity of the statute, not the predicament of an injured party. In
an abstract proceeding the Court simply declares what the Constitution
means or requires.19 The Court's role is to lay down the constitutional
rules for the governance of the political system on the particular issue
involved, a role that the Court is statutorily obligated to perform. The
power of judicial decision under the peculiarity of the German system is
enormous because the Court's holdings have the force of law and are
absolutely binding on all governing authorities.2° The American situa-
tion, of course, is messier because from time to time Congress and the
President have denied that they are bound by the decisions of the
Supreme Court.21
The Christian Democratic challenge to the Abortion Reform Act trig-
geredan immediate judicial response. On June 21, 1974, three days after
the passage of the reform statute, the Federal Constitutional Court en-
joined its enforcement pending a full hearing on the merits.22 Mean-
while, the old law and its penalties would continue in force. The U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade was well-known to the justices,
especially President Ernst Benda who was a student at the University of
Wisconsin in the 1950s and well versed in American constitutional law.
As had the U.S. Supreme Court, the Federal Constitutional Court ap-
proached its task fully recognizing the delicacy and complexity of the is-
sues before it.
A brief detour is appropriate to describe the structure of the Federal
Constitutional Court. The Court is composed of two senates - the First
and Second Senates - with mutually exclusive jurisdiction and person-
nel. Each senate has eight justices, and each speaks in the name of the
Court as a whole. The President or "Chief Justice" of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court presides over the First Senate; the Vice-President presides
over the Second Senate. The Bundestag and Bundesrat each elect one-
their basic rights under the Constitution its purpose is'also to declare the objective mean-
ing of the Basic Law. Horst Sticker, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht 46 (Bonn 1989).
19. See ERNST BENDA & ECKART KLEIN, LEHRBUCH DES VERFASSUNO-
SPROZE13RECHTS 276-77 (1991).
20. Gesetz tiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung of
12 December 1985, BGBL. I 2229-30, § 31(1),(2) [hereinafter BVerfGG].
21. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA-
TION 184-284 (1986).
22. 37 BVerfGE 324 (1975).
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half of the members of each senate for a single nonrenewable term of
twelve years. Nearly all of the Court's jurisdiction is laid down in the
Constitution itself, although the distribution of this jurisdiction between
the two senates is set forth in the Federal Constitutional Court Act.23
The Act, however, authorizes the Plenum - both senates sitting together
- to transfer jurisdiction from one senate to another if a gross imbalance
in the workloads of the two senates makes such a transfer necessary.24
In returning to our story, the Federal Constitutional Court handed
down its abortion decision on February 25, 1975, two years after Roe v.
Wade. In a six-to-two vote, with Benda in the majority, the First Senate
struck down every section of the statute.25 It did so under two clauses of
the Basic Law. One of these clauses proclaims the inviolability of human
dignity and charges the State with the duty "[t]o respect and protect it;"
26
the second declares that "[elveryone shall have the right to life and to the
inviolability of his person. '27 With the original history of these clauses in
mind, especially against the backdrop of the Nazi experience, the Court
ruled that the fetus is "life" within the meaning of the Constitution, and
that the state is obligated "to protect and foster this life" even against the
wishes of the pregnant woman.28 Finally, the Court defined abortion as
"an act of killing" whose condemnation the law must clearly express as a
way of educating the nation to the gravity of the evil.29
This strong endorsement of the right to life by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court did not mean, however, that fetal life must always prevail
over claims of the pregnant woman. Article 2 (1) of the Basic Law, which
embodies the principle of personal self-determination - the closest Ger-
man equivalent to our right of privacy found in the due process liberty
clause of the fourteenth amendment - confers upon everyone the "right
to the free development of his for her] personality in so far as he [or she]
does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional
order or the moral code."3° The Court acknowledged that for a pregnant
woman these clauses pose both a duty and a right, and when they conflict
a judicious balancing of interests may be necessary. In accord with this
23. BVerfGG, § 14.
24. Id. § 14(4).
25. 39 BVerfGE at 1 (1975).
26. The term "state" as used here refers to legislative, executive, and judicial author-
ity as these terms are used in the Basic Law. See GG arts. 1 § 3 and 20 § 3.
27. Id. art. 2, § 2.
28. 39 BVerfGE at 42.
29. Id. at 46.
30. GG art. 2, § 1.
1994]
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process of balancing, an abortion performed by a licensed physician in
the presence of a serious and duly certified medical, genetic, or crimino-
logical indication need not be punished under the German Basic Law.
Specifically, the Court held that in the presence of serious medical, ge-
netic, and criminological (i.e., rape or incest) indications, all previously
recognized by law or judicial decree, the law should not compel a woman
to carry her pregnancy to term.31 In short, a serious danger to the health
or life of the mother, the discovery of a gravely defective fetus, or a preg-
nancy resulting from rape or incest, may turn out to be so crushing a
burden that it would be "beyond reason" to expect the mother to give
birth to the child. In addition to these indications, the Court held that the
social predicament of a pregnant woman might also justify an abortion. 2
In order to sanction an abortion for social reasons, however, the distress
of the pregnant woman would have to be severe, producing hardships
exceeding those normally associated with pregnancy. In addition, a social
hardship abortion could only be performed after compulsory counseling,
proper certification, and within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. 3
Having laid down these rules, the Court examined the Reform Act's
counseling provisions and found them seriously flawed. Merely im-
parting in a neutral fashion information about financial assistance or the
nature of abortive surgery was insufficient to satisfy the State's constitu-
tional duty to protect human life. Such counseling, said the Court, espe-
cially when combined with the woman's freedom to choose within the
first trimester, would convey the "false impression" that abortion is like
any other operation.34 Accordingly, counselors must stress that abortion
is a moral evil in the absence of indications justifying the termination of
pregnancy. Moreover, the medical counselor may not be the same person
doing the abortion on the assumption that a woman would be improperly
advised by a physician with a financial stake in performing the
operation.35
Finally, a full understanding of the 1975 decision requires some discus-
sion of what the Germans call an "objective order of values," a concept
derived from a gloss that the Federal Constitutional Court has put on the
31. 39 BVerfGE at 48.
32. Id. at 50-51.
33. Id. at 54.
34. Id. at 44.
35. Id. at 62-63.
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text of the Basic Law.36 The. Constitution must be interpreted in the
light of public values derived from a reading of the Basic Law as a whole
and particularly from its list of guaranteed rights, a list crowned by the
inviolate principle of human dignity. 7 Under this theory, the Basic Law
includes both individual rights and public values. An individual right is a
subjective right that can be asserted against the state and thus capable of
judicial vindication. But the right also embodies an objective value (i.e., a
public value) and, as such, is said to have an independent force or effect
under the Constitution, thereby imposing an affirmative duty on the State
to ensure that the public value is realized in practice. An objective value
then is an integral part of Germany's general legal order and the state
must see to it that this value is maximized to the extent possible.
The German Court has also declared that these objective values ar-
range themselves in a hierarchy. This can only mean that the Courtitself
does the arranging. Human dignity, according to the Court, is the Basic
Law's supreme value the chief manifestation of which'is the right to life.
While the right to personality holds an exalted rank in the hierarchy of
basic values, it must give way when it conflicts with the prior right to
life.3" But what is "life" and when does it begin? Listen to the Court:
"Life in the sense of [the] historical existence of a human individual exists
according to definite biological-physiological knowledge, in any case,
from the 14th day after conception [i.e., at implantation]."3 9 This pro-
nouncement diverged radically from the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal in
Roe v. Wade to say when life begins. It was also a radical departure from
the American Court's view that a state has no compelling interest in pro-
tecting "potential life" until the last trimester of pregnancy. By contrast,
the German tribunal emphasized, as did the dissenting opinions in Roe v.
Wade, that pregnancy "is a continuous process of development that mili-
tates against its division into precise stages. '
A central question before the Constitutional Court was whether the
state's constitutional duty to protect the life of the fetus would require
the legislature to criminalize abortion. The Court suggested that the
criminal law would have to be employed if that was the only way to deter
abortions in situations where pregnant women would be unable to sub-
36. See 6 BVerfGE 32 at 40; see also Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism:
A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 858-60 (1991).
37. 39 BVerfGE at 42.
38. Id. at 43.
39. Id. at 37.
40. Id.
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stantiate the presence of an indication that would justify the termination
of a pregnancy. The decisive factor, said the Court, was whether the sum
of all legal measures, civil or criminal, would adequately protect unborn
life. In brief, the sum of these measures would have to be proportionate
to the significance, of the protected constitutional value (i.e., life).41 In
the present case, the Court instructed the legislature to reimpose the
criminal penalty because the non-penal measures in the Abortion Reform
Act of 1974 were, as a whole, insufficient to protect the fetus. Whether
any package of non-penal measures would by themselves be sufficient to
protect unborn life was an issue the Court left to another day.
The first chapter in our story ends with parliament's adoption of all the
instructions and guidelines laid out by the Federal Constitutional Court,
including the recriminalization of abortion except in the presence of indi-
cations specified by law.42 A second chapter might have described how
this judicially imposed abortion policy actually worked against the back-
drop of a changing political and demographic environment, particularly
one that appeared to grow more tolerant of abortion over the years.43
Perhaps it is sufficient to note that most legal abortions occurred in cases
of social hardship, but the standards used to determine "hardship" varied
from Land to Land, depending largely on whether Social or Christian
Democrats controlled the local government."
II
The next chapter of my story begins in 1990 with German unification.
On the day of unity, eighteen million East Germans found themselves
subject to West Germany's legal order, including the Basic Law. The
unity talks, however, failed to bring about a common policy on abor-
tion.45 In 1972, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had adopted a
41. Id. at 46.
42. See Strafrechtstlnderungsgesetz of 18 May 1976 [The Abortion Reform Act of
1976], BGBL. 11213, §§ 3, 4.
43. See Joyce M. Mushaben, Paper entitled The Politics of Abortion in United Ger-
many, delivered at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
14-16 (Sept. 2-5, 1993) (transcript on file with the American Political Science Association).
44. Germany is a federal state. The Basic Law thus divides authority between the
states or Lander and the national government. It was relatively difficult for a woman to
procure an abortion for social reasons in states governed by the Christian Democrats and
relatively less difficult in states governed by Social Democrats. See Ursula Nelles, Abor-
tion, the Special Case: A Constitutional Perspective, GERMAN Soc'Y & POL., Winter 1991-
92, at 114, 114-15.
45. For a discussion of the East-West conflict over abortion, see PETER H. MERKL,
GERMAN UNIFICATION IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 176-81 (1993).
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law permitting abortion on demand within the first trimester of preg-
nancy,46 a statutory right, according to the delegates of the old GDR, that
East German women were not prepared to give up without a struggle.
East and West German negotiators broke the deadlock over abortion by
agreeing to retain their respective laws until an all-German parliament
elected in a unified Germany could work out a compromise acceptable to
both sides, the Unification Treaty having specified December 31, 1992 as
the deadline for the adoption of an all-German statute.47
The Basic Law actually endorsed this settlement. Article 143, a transi-
tional amendment that the Unification Treaty itself put into the Constitu-
tion, allowed the new states belonging to the old GDR to "deviate" from
certain provisions of the Basic Law.41 The eastern states were allowed to
do so (i.e., deviate from existing constitutional provisions) pending the
adoption, within a specified time, of a common national policy. As ap-
plied to abortion, the deviation clause prompted critical constitutional
questions, particularly because the Basic Law forbids the passage of any
law encroaching on the essence of a basic right.49
In addition, the Basic Law disallows any constitutional amendment
that offends the principle of human dignity.50 Was Article 143, therefore,
an unconstitutional amendment to the Constitution for having offended
the principle of human dignity as judicially defined? Alternatively, may
an amendment to the Constitution authorize the eastern states to ignore,
even temporarily, an authoritative judicial ruling interpreting the concept
of "life" within the meaning of the Basic Law? Although agitating to
constitutional scholars, these issues were never adjudicated. Rather,
46. Gesetz vom 9. MArz 1972 tiber die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft, GBL.
DDR I 89. The administration of the East German law was far from ideal. See Margare-
the Nirnsch, Abortion as Politics, GERMAN SOC'v & POL., Winter 1991-92, at 130.
47. Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic on the Establishment of German Unity [hereinafter Unification RTeaty], Aug. 31,
1990, BGBL.II 889, art. 31, § 4.
48. The new Article 143, § 1 of the Basic Law declares:
[East German law] may deviate from provisions of this Basic Law for a period not
extending beyond December 31, 1992 in so far as and as long as no complete
adjustment to the order of the Basic Law can be achieved as a consequence of the
different conditions. Deviations must not violate Article 19 (2) and must be com-
patible with the principles set out in Article 79 (3).
See Unification Treaty, art. 4, § 1. The Constitution bans any encroachment on "the essen-
tial content of a basic right" guaranteed in the Basic Law. GG art. 19, § 2. The Constitu-
tion also prohibits any constitutional amendment that would undermine the basic
principles of the Constitution, including the guarantee of human dignity. GG art. 79, § 3.
49. GG art. 19, § 2.
50. Id. at art. 1, § 1.
1994]
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what would be contested at law was whether an all-German statute in
conflict with the 1975 abortion decision would survive constitutional
analysis.
51
The first all-German parliament elected on December 2, 1990 struggled
to find a middle ground between the conflicting abortion policies of East
and West Germany.52 By May 1992, six months prior to the deadline
established by the Unification Treaty for the passage of a new statute
governing all of Germany, a severely fractured Bundestag had before it
several proposals. These proposals ranged from a plan to increase the
severity of West Germany's existing abortion law to a proposal based on
unrestricted freedom of choice. Each parliamentary party along the
political spectrum put forward a draft bill.53 The Social Democratic Party
(SDP) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) occupied the broad middle
ground. After long and painful negotiations stretching over many
months, these two parties - one a member of the ruling coalition, the
other the main opposition party - broke the logjam and reached a com-
promise. The settlement - an omnibus bill amending numerous provi-
sions of public law - was sufficiently attractive to win the support of
most Christian Democratic representatives from East Germany as well as
other East German representatives. Dubbed the "group resolution"
(Gruppenantrag) because it embodied an agreement transcending party
lines, the compromise won by a substantial margin of 357 to 283 votes.54
51. The Unification Treaty did not change the jurisdiction or powers of the Federal
Constitutional Court. Thus, the Court retains the full power of constitutional review over
laws enacted and treaties made under the authority of the Basic Law.
52. In the meantime, the ruling CDU-CSU-FDP coalition in Bonn adopted a resolu-
tion denying West German women the right to procure abortions in East Germany under
the latter's relaxed rules. This resulted in the anomalous situation where one and the same
act in one and the same place would be treated differently under the law, an anomaly that
prompted several constitutional scholars, including a former justice of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court, to object to the resolution on equal protection grounds. See STurrGARTER
ZErrUNG, Aug. 24, 1990. The equal protection conundrum served to underscore the ur-
gency of finding an all-German solution to the problem of abortion.
53. The German Bundestag had before it seven proposals. The most liberal proposal,
advocated by the Greens and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) would have been
an outright repeal of § 218. The most conservative proposal, supported by a member of
Bavaria's Christian Social Union (CSU), would have permitted abortions only for serious
medical reasons. In general, the Greens favored a policy of abortion on demand through-
out pregnancy; Social Democrats preferred a "time phase" solution with freedom of choice
during the first three months of pregnancy; Free Democrats advocated a time phase solu-
tion with compulsory counseling; and Christian Democrats supported abortion only in the
presence of indications specified'by law, although they were divided among themselves
over whether abortions should be permitted for serious social reasons.
54. For details on the passage of the bill, see DAs PARLAMENT, July 3, 1992, at 1.
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The Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act was the short title of the new
all-German statute.55 It incorporated a time-phase solution with obliga-
tory counseling. The Act's provisions reflected the spirit of the Unifica-
tion Treaty, Article thirty-one of which directed the all-German
parliament to "ensure [the] better protection of unborn life" and to adopt
social policies that would "provide a better solution" to the problem of
pregnant women in distress "than is the case in either part of Germany at
present."'56 Accordingly, the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act em-
bodied detailed provisions amending not only the Criminal Code's provi-
sions on abortion (sections 218-19),"7 but also sections of laws dealing
with social security, medical insurance, child support, vocational training,
job placement, welfare assistance, housing and rent control, all for the
purpose of producing a package of socioeconomic guarantees that would
make it easier for women in distress to carry their pregnancies to term.58
Significantly, the main combatants in the legislative arena harbored no
doubts about their constitutional duty to protect the life of the unborn.
Rather, the struggle centered on how best to achieve this goal. To this
extent, the debate over abortion in Germany shaped up very differently
than in the United States.
The new statute, however, departed from the constitutional rules laid
down by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1975. While as a matter of
general policy abortion would continue as a criminal offense under law in
a unified Germany, the new amendments to the criminal code cut the
heart out of the Abortion Reform Act of 1976. In words that would come
back to haunt the Bundestag, the new change in the criminal code de-
clared that the interruption of pregnancy in some circumstances is "not
illegal" (nicht rechtswidrig).5 9 Specifically, no criminal penalty would at-
tach to an abortion if performed by a licensed physician with the woman's
consent within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy after compulsory
counseling and a three day waiting period.6' But before an abortion
55. Gesetz zum Schutz des vorgeburtlichen/werdenden Lebens, zur Forderung einer
kinderfreundlicheren Gesellschaft, fUr Hilfen im Schwangerschaftskonflikt und zur
Regelung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs (Schwangeren- und Familienhilfegesetz) of 27
June 1992, BGBL. 1 1398 [hereinafter SFHG].
56. Unification Treaty, art. 31, § 4.
57. Article 13 of the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act amended §§ 218-19 of the
German Criminal Code. These amended sections (Anderung des Strafgesetzbuches) con-
stitute the Abortion Reform Act of 1992. STRAFGESETZBUCHREFORM [STGBR] art. 13
(1992).
58. SFHG, supra note 56, at arts. 1-16.
59. STGBR, § 218a(2).
60. Id. § 218(1). Under § 218a(3) an abortion is not punishable if there are medical
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could be performed, the woman would have to produce a certificate veri-
fying the place and date of counseling,6' and the physician-counselor issu-
ing the certificate could not be the same doctor who would perform the
abortion.62 After the twelfth week of pregnancy, however, the woman
could only legally abort her fetus to avert a serious threat to her life or a
grave impairment of her physical or mental health.63
The statute's counseling provisions, which would loom large in the en-
suing litigation, directed counselors to stress the value of unborn life and
to encourage women in distress to make a responsible and conscientious
decision. To this end, counselors were obliged to supply women with de-
tailed medical, social and legal advice, including the availability of "prac-
tical assistance" designed to mitigate the distress of both mother and
child.6' The counseling bureau was required to keep a record of each
session, but in the interest of privacy and at the woman's request her
identity would not be revealed.65 Finally, as with the Abortion Reform
Acts of 1974 and 1976, the statute banned the commercialization of abor-
tion services.'
To summarize: Under the new all-German statute, it was "not illegal"
(nicht rechtswidrig) for a woman to procure an abortion within three
months of pregnancy after required counseling, certification, and a three
day waiting period. The new law was a hard-won compromise painfully
worked out in the parliamentary trenches and against the backdrop of
strong pressures exerted by religious, feminist, and eleemosynary groups.
Previously in West Germany, a woman had to have a certificate from a
doctor indicating that she had met at least one of four conditions speci-
fied by law before she could obtain permission to have an abortion free of
punishment. Previously in East Germany, a woman could choose to have
an abortion on demand at any time and for any reason within the first
trimester of pregnancy. The all-German law - a counseling model which
incorporated prolife inducements, but left the ultimate choice to the wo-
man - appeared to split the difference between West Germany's old "in-
dications" model and East Germany's old "on-demand" model.
grounds for believing that the damage to the fetus is so severe that the ensuing burden
upon the woman would be such as to obviate the need to continue her pregnancy and its
termination takes place between 12 and 22 weeks of conception. Id. at § 218a(3).
61. Id. § 218b(1).
62. Id. § 219b(2).
63. Id. § 218a(2).
64. Id. § 219(1).
65. Id. § 219(3).
66. Id. § 219a(1).
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III
Now, to the final chapter of my story.
As already noted, the Bundestag passed the new all-German abortion
statute on June 26, 1992.67 Shortly thereafter, on July 2, 1992, the
Bundesrat concurred,68 whereupon the Federal President signed the bill
into law. Within hours of the signing, and with the backing of Chancellor
Helmut Kohl,69 249 Christian Democratic members of the Bundestag, all
from the former West Germany, petitioned the Constitutional Court to
enjoin the law's enforcement. 70 Bavaria's state government, claiming
that several provisions of the statute were unconstitutional, filed a sepa-
rate petition.7 ' In a preliminary hearing, after a full day of oral argument
on August 4, 1992, the day before the law would have gone into effect,
the Second Senate, to the surprise of many constitutional scholars and to
the chagrin of others, unanimously issued the injunction.72
Composed of seven men and one woman - all West Germans evenly
split between Catholics and Protestants, on the one hand, and Christian
and Social Democrats, on the other - the Second Senate reinstated the
respective abortion laws of East and West, pending a full decision on the
merits.73 In an effort to' calm the worst fears of lawmakers who had
worked so hard to produce a tolerable compromise, Vice-President Ernst
Gottfried Mahrenholz, the presiding officer of the Second Senate, an-
nounced that the temporary injunction to enjoin the statute would furnish
no clue to the outcome of the main proceeding. Speaking for the Court,
Mahrenholz stated that it would be contrary to the public interest to al-
low a statute of this importance to enter into force if there were any
chance that it might have to be repealed after a judicial decision on the
merits.74 He was also reported as having said that a final decision could
67. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, June 27, 1992, at 1.
68. All the Lnder except Bavaria voted in favor of the new law. FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, July 3, 1992, at 1. In this instance, unlike the situation under the
Abortion Reform Act of 1974, the concurrence of the Bundesrat was necessary because of
the new administrative responsibilities that the Lnder would now be required to carry out
and finance.
69. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, June 30, 1992, at 1.
70. Docket No. 2 BvF, May, 1992.
71. Id.
72. Judgment of Aug. 4, 1992, 86 BVerfGE 390 (Second Senate). See also SODDEUT-
SCHE ZEITUNG, Aug. 6, 1992, at 6; DEUTSCHEs ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT, Aug. 7,
1992, at 11.
73. 86 BVerfGE at 390.
74. SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Aug. 6, 1992, at 1; DIE ZErr, Aug. 7, 1992, at 1.
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be expected in November.75
Instead of the predicted three months, however, the Court struggled
with the case for another ten months. The nation watched closely as the
Court repeatedly postponed decision day amid rumors of deep divisions
among the justices.76 Meanwhile, outside the Court, Social Democratic
members of parliament considered challenging the participation of two
Catholic justices because of their known opposition to abortion,77 an ef-
fort widely seen as a blatant attempt to intimidate these justices in partic-
ular and to strike generally at the Court's independence in general.78
For a brief moment on May 28,1993, many Germans held their breath.
In an unusual public session broadcast to the nation, the Second Senate
invalidated major sections of the new Abortion Reform Act. 79 The pub-
lic reaction was predictable. On the one hand, Social Democratic legisla-
tors cried foul, protestors took to the streets, and a popular East German
female politician denounced the ruling as a "catastrophe" and "a return
to the Middle Ages."8 For his part, Chancellor Kohl praised the Court
for its defense of unborn life, while Germany's Catholic bishops an-
nouriced that they could live with the ruling.
81
/5. STUTrGARTER ZEITUNG, Aug. 6, 1992, at 1.
76. See DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 9, 1992, at 147-50.
77. See FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Dec. 2, 1992, at 6; DER SPIEGEL, Nov.
9, 1992, at 16.
78. Under the Federal Constitutional Court Act, a justice's participation in a case may
be challenged if there are grounds for believing that he would be unable to render an
unbiased judgment. Certain Social Democratic legislators in the federal and state parlia-
ments challenged the participation of Justice Ernst-Wolfgang Bdckenforde, a practicing
Catholic, because he belonged to a lawyers' right-to-life group from 1986 to 1990. If, in the
face of such a challenge, the justice does not recuse himself, the Senate decides the matter
in his absence after the challenged justice has submitted a formal statement on his own
behalf. See BVerfGG, § 19 (2). In the present case, Bockenforde's seven colleagues on the
Second Senate unanimously ruled in his favor. On the basis of the record before them,
they declared that his former membership in the right-to-life association was not a ground
on which to conclude that he would be unable to render an unbiased judgment. See 88
BVerfGE 17. A touch of irony marked the effort of some Social Democrats to force Bock-
enfdrde off the Second Senate in the Abortion Case. First, Bdckenftrde was himself a
Social Democrat. Second, the SPD was responsible for his election to the Second Senate.
Lastly, as a professor of legal philosophy at Freiburg University, he had been identified
intellectually with the more liberal views of the SPD's left wing. His prolific writings as a
legal philosopher, however, also identified him as a leading Catholic intellectual in the
German legal academy. This identification, along with his membership in an anti-abortion
group, prompted some Social Democrats to doubt his reliability on the issue of abortion.
79. See FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, May 29, 1993, at 1, 3.
80. Stephen Kinzer, German Court Restricts Abortion, Angering Feminists and the
East, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1993, at 1.
81. See FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 29 May, 1993, at 3.
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The actual opinion - originally 183 pages in typescript - contrasted
sharply with the bombastic rhetoric and combative tone of much of the
public commentary immediately following the ruling. When the dust had
settled, however, more and more Germans began to realize that the deci-
sion was a sensitive and nuanced attempt, undertaken with remarkable
empathy and understanding, to balance the State's interest in protecting
life with the woman's interest in self-determination. The nub of the deci-
sion was this: In the interest of preserving the value of unborn life, abor-
tion must remain illegal, but the State need not punish the illegal act if
the abortion takes place within the first three months of pregnancy and
after the State has had an opportunity to try to get the pregnant woman
to change her mind. 2
The Second Senate's opinion begins with a review of the 1975 abortion
case, much as the U.S. Supreme Court revisited Roe v. Wade in its 1992
decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Like the U.S. Supreme Court
in Casey, the Constitutional Court reaffirmed the essential core of its pre-
vious decision. At the core of that. 1975 decision lay the Basic Law's
clauses on the "right to life" and "human dignity." The right to life en-
joyed by the unborn child, declared the Court in the 1993 Abortion Case,
"emanates from the dignity of the human being," the validity of which is
"independent of any specific religious or philosophical belief."8 3 Dignity,
declared the Court, attaches to the 'physical existence of every human
being, before as well as after birth. Unborn life is a constitutional value
that the state is obligated to protect. Indeed, as the Court had declared in
1975, the state cannot escape this responsibility.
Given the assumptions about the value of fetal life and the correspond-
ing duty of the State to protect it, the Court found fatally flawed the stat-
utory language describing the voluntary interruption of pregnancy within
the first three months as "not illegal."'  These words, said the Court,
communicate the wrong message. They treat abortion as a justifiable
choice, as a less than serious matter, and as an option on the same consti-
tutional level as childbirth. In declaring unconstitutional the section of
the reformed criminal code containing the words "not illegal,, 85 the Sen-
ate ruled that the statute must make clear that as a matter of general
principle abortion is in fact illegal and that the pregnant woman has a
legal duty, again as a matter of general principle, to carry the child to
82. Judgment of May 28, 1993, 88 BVerfGE 203 (Second Senate).
83. Id. at 252.
84. Id. at 299.
85. STGBR, § 218a(1).
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In further clarifying its 1975 decision, the Senate went on to say that in
some situations an abortion may be "justified."' However, it is only in
these situations that an abortion may be characterized as "not illegal"
(nicht rechtswidrig).,s Here the Court follows the typical German ap-
proach to the analysis of crime and its punishment.s9 The first step in this
analysis is to establish that an offense or illegal act (Tatbestand) has taken
place. A crime takes place when the objective and subjective elements
that define it as a crime are present. Abortion is objectively a crime when
someone invades the body of a woman to interrupt a pregnancy. The
necessary subjective element is present when the person who commits the
act wills it. In the second step, it must be determined whether the wrong-
ful act is illegal (Rechtswidrigkeit). The wrongful act will not be found to
be illegal if justifiable reasons exist for its commission (e.g., killing some-
one in self-defense). In the third stage, it must be determined whether
the person committing the act is personally blameworthy (Schuld). If
personal guilt is established, punishment (Strafe) usually follows. But
there are exceptions to this rule. A penalty might not be imposed for the
commission if an illegal act of cogent reasons exist for exempting a per-
son from punishment.
Accordingly, applying this reasoning to abortion, while any deliberate
destruction of the fetus after the fourteenth day of conception is an "act
of killing," thus satisfying the elements of a criminal act (Tatbestand), this
act may be "justified" and thus declared "not illegal" (nicht rechtswidrig)
in some circumstances. These circumstances the Court limits to serious
medical, genetic, and criminological indications which a valid law must
specify.' In still other situations, as noted below, an illegal act need not
be punished if extenuating circumstances of a severe nature diminish the
actor's guilt (Schuld).
In the Constitutional Court's 1975 decision, a serious social predica-
ment was among the reasons "justifying" an abortion. In its 1993 deci-
sion, the Court omits social indications from its list of reasons justifying
an abortion, presumably because social reasons are likely to predominate
86. 88 BVerfGE at 253, 273.
87. Id. at 270.
88. Id. at 270. The Court is referring to abortions carried out for serious medical,
genetic, or criminological reasons.
89. Fritjof Haft, Strafrecht, Allegemeiner Tel, (5th ed. 1992): 13-17; Johannes Wessels,
Strafrecht, Allegemeiner Teil, (23rd ed. 1993): 257-61.
90. 88 BVerfGE at 273-74.
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under any regulatory scheme that allows the woman freedom of choice
within the first trimester of pregnancy after submitting to obligatory
counseling. The Second Senate ruled, however, that any non-indicated
abortion taking place within the "time-phase" counseling plan must re-
main illegal (rechtswidrig) even though the State may elect not to prose-
cute such illegal acts.
Adhering to the core of its 1975 decision, the Court declared that any
non-indicated abortion must be declared illegal (rechtswidrig).91 Any
balance struck between the conflicting interests of the fetus and pregnant
woman would have to reflect the overriding importance of the core val-
ues of human "dignity" and "life" as these terms are used within the
meaning of the Constitution. Given the hierarchical arrangement of the
Constitution's "objective values" (i.e., those values the State is constitu-
tionally obligated to defend) the unborn child's right to life precedes the
wishes of the pregnant woman unless an abortion is "justified" by some
indication specified by law. Abortions not so specified, declared the Sec-
ond Senate, cannot be justified, for to declare non-indicated abortions
"not illegal" and thus justifiable would conflict with the State's constitu-
tional duty to "respect and protect" the "dignity of man."92
Could the State achieve the proper constitutional balance between the
"right to life" and "personality" clauses of the Basic Law by other than
penal means? In what some commentators thought was a major change
in emphasis from its 1975 decision, the Second Senate answered in the
affirmative. For the first time, the Court seemed prepared to allow non-
indicated abortions obtained in the first trimester of pregnancy to remain
unpunished (straffrei). The social context had changed radically since
1975. The Court could no longer ignore the reality of abortion-on-de-
mand in East Germany and changing attitudes toward abortion in West
Germany. By 1990, public opinion polls were showing that large numbers
of West Germans would ease restrictions on abortion in early pregnancy.
The Second Senate's problem was to find some way of bringing estab-
lished constitutional principles into line with social reality, while also try-
ing to shape social reality in accord with those principles.
The Second Senate concluded that a statutory scheme may include a
time-phase plan with compulsory counseling (i.e., a plan that would leave
the final decision to the pregnant woman) so long as the regulatory
91. Id. at 273.
92. Id. (citing GG art. 1, § 1).
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scheme as a whole "effectively and sufficiently" protects unborn life.93
In other words, the state may validly conclude that in view of the reality
of abortion in modern society, the more effective solution to the problem
of unwanted pregnancy is to stay the hand of would-be prosecutors, to
make an ally and friend of the woman in distress, to forswear threats of
punishment, and to induce her to cooperate voluntarily with the state
without any fear of retribution or loss of personal integrity.94
Under the Court's 1975 decision, a pregnant woman would have to
convince counselors that her-social predicament was "severe" before an
abortion could be certified as "indicated." Under its 1993 ruling, the wo-
man need not carry this burden of proof because such a requirement
would defeat the purpose of counseling. To shift the burden of proof to
the woman would be threatening rather than facilitating, the Court noted,
making counselors judges instead of helpers. Counselors, said the Court,
are to act with compassion and understanding, to deal sympathetically
with the pregnant woman's "conflict situation" (Konfliktsituation), and to
insure that she is aware of the significance of the life germinating within
her. The Second Senate characterized this process as "preventive protec-
tion through counseling." 95 Counseling of this nature, the Court empha-
sized, requires advisors who can be trusted to convey a strong prolife
message, to treat women in distress respectfully, and provide them with
comprehensive information about available care, facilities and financial
support.96
At this stage of its lengthy opinion, the Court closely scrutinized the
social service and counseling provisions of the Pregnancy and Family
Assistance Act, finding several of them constitutionally deficient. 7
These deficiencies or omissions in the law can be summarized briefly.
First, the law failed sufficiently to emphasize the normative goal of abor-
tion counseling. Compulsory counseling, declared the Court, must be ori-
ented toward the constitutional goal of preserving unborn life. At the
same time, out of respect for the well-being and dignity of the pregnant
woman, the counselors could not legally dictate the outcome of such
counseling. But since both doctors and counselors have a legal duty to
fortify a pregnant woman's sense of responsibility to the unborn child, the
state must ensure that counselors and doctors are worthy of this trust.




97. SFHG, art. 1, § 2.
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Merely to encourage pregnant women to make a conscientious decision
after informing them of the care and services that would be available if
they carry their pregnancies to term is insufficient. As already noted,
counselors must confront the "conflict situation" of the woman, empha-
size the value of unborn life, and encourage the woman to continue her
pregnancy.98
Second, if counseling is to be effective, said the Court, it must be
backed up with social assistance and other forms of public support that
would enable a woman to carry her pregnancy to term. The Court
seemed to suggest that the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act was a
significant step in this direction, but that the legislation would have to be
reexamined in terms of its declared purpose. Parliament, said the Second
Senate, must consider the present and future living conditions of preg-
nant women and, if necessary, provide them with needed care as well as
with the financial assistance to maintain the wholeness and integrity of
their families.99 By the same token, counselors must inform the woman
of the various and generous forms of assistance available if she carries her
child to term. In support of such assistance, the Second Senate invoked
Article 6 of the Basic Law. Article 6 places "marriage and family" under
the "special protection of the state" 1" and proclaims that "[elvery
mother shall be entitled to the protection and care of the community."' 0 '
The Court instructed parliament to take these constitutional commands
seriously when devising a policy on abortion.
Third, the Court emphasized the need to insure that women and
mothers would not lose their jobs or undergo serious financial hardship as
a consequence of pregnancy or childbirth. Out of respect for a pregnant
woman's right to personality, the state must create an environment of job
security and guaranteed welfare that would help her to make a decision
in favor of childbirth. "The legislature [must] provide the basis," declared
the Court, "for a balance between family activities and gainful employ-
ment and guarantee that the task of raising children in a family will not
lead to any disadvantage in the workplace."' 2 Thus, said the Court, the
State is obligated to adopt "legal and actual measures designed to enable
both parents simultaneously to raise their children and pursue gainful
employment and to return to their jobs without. losing the opportunity for
98. 88 BVerfGE at 282-83.
99. Id. at 258.
100. Id. (citing GG art. 6, § 1).
101. Id. (citing GG art 6, § 4).
102. Id. at 260.
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professional advancement following periods of child care., 10 3 When con-
sidered in tandem with the Basic Law's command that "[m]en and wo-
men shall have equal rights," the "marriage and family" clause serves to
reinforce the state's responsibility to incorporate these protections into
public law. 1"
Fourth, and continuing in this vein, the Court suggested that the legisla-
ture may be required to amend aspects of private law to facilitate a deci-
sion in favor of childbirth. For example, the Court proposed that
landlords be prohibited from terminating leases because of the arrival of
a newborn child in the household. The Court also suggested amending
the consumer credit laws to ease the financial burden of women and their
families in the aftermath of childbirth.
1 05
Fifth, a major omission in the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act
was the legislature's failure to insure that a pregnant woman would not
abort her fetus owing to the social pressures of friends and relatives. In
fact, counselors may request the participation of the father; and close rela-
tives if they are exerting pressure on the woman to abort her fetus. The
Court even suggested that the penal law might be used to punish any
person - lover, father, husband, mother, friend or employer - who
would place undue pressure on a pregnant woman to have an abortion,
and thus abet the commission of a crime. If the protection of unborn life
is indeed a normative constitutional goal that the State is obligated to
defend under the Basic Law, then the State can do no less than to liberate
women, to the extent possible, from the social pressures that would un-
dermine this goal."°
Sixth, and in one of its most controversial rulings, the Second Senate
nullified provisions of the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act permit-
ting non-hardship abortions to be paid from the state's medical insurance
system (Krankenversicherung). This ban extends, said the Court, to pri-
vate medical insurance policies. Since private law must conform to the
basic values of the Constitution, a private contract allowing medical cov-
erage for an abortion would to that extent be illegal. Lawful abortions -
that is, those duly certified for medical, genetic, and criminological rea-
sons - may be covered by the national health plan, but "illegal" abor-
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing GG art. 3, § 2). The Second Senate found that the legislature had made
a favorable beginning by increasing the monthly allowance for the care of children and
providing for additional job security following childbirth. See id. (citing SHFG, art. 5).
105. Id. at 260.
106. Id. at 253, 295.
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tions may not be so funded. Financing "illegal" abortions out of the
national health insurance plan, declared the Court, would make the State
a participant in an unjustifiable act and convey the wrong message about
the nature of abortion." 7
At the same time, the Court took the position that the state may not
constitutionally deny welfare assistance to a poor woman who is unable
to afford a non-indicated abortion but who wants one. If a woman is
poor (bedUrftig) and eligible for help under the Welfare Assistance Act
(Bundessozialhilfegesetz) then the abortion must be paid out of state wel-
fare funds. The distinction that the Court makes between welfare assist-
ance and medical insurance is more than just a fight about what fund to
draw on.' Symbolically the distinction is important. Denying medical
coverage to a nonpunishable illegal abortion expresses the view of the
German legal order that such an abortion cannot officially be sanctioned.
The state recognizes, however, that a pregnant woman may face an emer-
gency, especially if she is poor, and if her predicament drives her to end
her pregnancy even after the required counseling, the state as a last resort
will pay for the abortion in the interest of her health and welfare.
Here the Court spoke with a human voice, as it did when ruling that
the state, prior to issuing an abortion certificate, could not force the wo-
man to consult with parents, husband or family. The state must guaran-
tee that "no woman will be prevented from going to a licensed physician
to procure an abortion merely because she lacks the financial means to
do so." '' 9 If the counseling system is to work, said the Court once again,
a woman in distress must be encouraged to see the counselors, to talk
with them voluntarily, and to do so in a non-intimidating context. If the
woman insists on having the abortion after the prescribed counseling has
taken place, the counselors must provide her with a valid certificate, sup-
ply her with the names and addresses of doctors and facilities willing to
perform the abortion and, if necessary, pay for the abortion out of gen-
eral social welfare funds. Any other system, the Court suggested, would
drive the woman away from counseling and perhaps into the hands of
illegal abortionists. After all, the objective of the counseling system is to
put the illegal abortionist out of business.
Seventh, and in keeping with its scrupulous prolife line of reasoning,
the Second Senate sustained the ban on commercialized abortion serv-
107. Id. at 315-16.
108. John Garvey's query in his letter of 14 February 1994.
109. Id. at 321.
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ices, even suggesting that legislators consider the French scheme which
restricts the number of abortions that can take place in any medical clinic
or health facility.11° Under the Court's decision counseling facilities must
be certified and supervised by the state, and the Lander must ensure that
all women have access to counseling facilities. The Court showered its
disapproval on abortion facilities such as Pro Familia, a private organiza-
tion in which a woman could be counseled in one office and then immedi-
ately referred to another in the same facility where she would meet the
doctor who would perform the operation. Such profit-making operations,
suggested the Court, are not likely to respect the constitutional value of
unborn life. Accordingly, the Second Senate admonished parliament to
separate counseling facilities from institutions with a financial interest in
carrying out abortions.111 The Court's language was emphatic: "Every
material entanglement of counseling agencies with institutions that would
encourage or carry out an abortion is [constitutionally] forbidden.""' 2
Finally, the Second Senate held unconstitutional an amendment to the
Federal Statistics Act that dropped the requirement for detailed reports
on abortion. 113 The Court ruled-that abortion statistics constitute a nec-
essary means of determining whether the counseling system is working,
and the Justices instructed parliament to consult these statistics regularly
to ensure that the counseling system is working as planned.' 1 4
Two dissenting opinions were written in the 1993 Abortion Case. An
opinion by Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, the Second Senate's "chief jus-
tice," in which Justice Sommer concurred, dissented from the majority's
view that non-hardship abortions were to be classified as "illegal" in the
criminal code. In general, these justices felt that the Pregnancy and Fam-
ily Assistance Act struck an adequate balance between the rights of life
and personality under the Basic Law. Justice Ernst-Wolfgang B6ck-
enf6rde, whose participation in the case was unsuccessfully challenged by
some Social Democrats,1 5 wrote a second dissenting opinion to question
the Court's ban on paying for "illegal" abortions out of the state's medi-
110. Id. at 294-95.
111. Id. at 287.
112. Id. A legitimate counseling agency need not be part of the state bureaucracy.
Many are private. In Germany, however, given the indirect effect of basic constitutional
values in the private legal sphere, a constitutional tort action could conceivably be brought
against a private counseling agency that advocates abortions in violation of the Constitu-
tional Court's rulings.
113. SFHG, art. 15(2). See also 39 BVerfGE 209.
114. 39 BVerfGE 309-12.
115. See supra note 78.
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cal insurance program. Whether abortions performed for serious social
reasons should be a part of the national health plan was, in his view, a
matter of legislative discretion. But this was a peripheral point.116 On
the essential core of the judgment, he voted with the majority in a 6-2
decision.
117
What, finally, was the impact of the decision on Germany? Under the
Federal Constitutional Court Act, decisions like the Abortion Case of
1993 have the force of law."' In addition, the Court has reserved to itself
the power to lay down general guidelines for the enactment of new legis-
lation incorporating its rulings. Often the Court instructs parliament ex-
actly and precisely what rules must be adopted in new legislation. In
some instances, the Court has set a deadline for the passage of such legis-
lation. No deadline was laid down in the 1993 Abortion Case, most
likely, as speculation would have it, out of deference to a parliament pre-
paring for a new national election." 9 The Court did rule, however, that
its decision would enter into force on June 15, 1993 and that it would
apply to all of Germany. In the meantime, the Court issued an interim
list of decrees, many of them seeking to restructure the counseling pro-
cess in accordance with its prolife views.
116. Gerald L. Neuman takes issue with this statement in his letter of November 15,
1993. He writes:
I am not sure how it is best to think of your description of the court's holding
regarding "socially indicated" abortions. On the surface, I disagree with your
description - I would rather say (and do say) that the court held that unevalu-
ated abortions could not be treated as justified, and held or stated under a coun-
seling regime "socially indicated" abortions could not be evaluated (whether it
held this or stated this being a matter of important dispute in Germany now). But
I don't think the decision holds that "socially indicated" abortions based on a
need which is as intense as the other ,three indications would not be justified if
there were a third-party determination of the need. This is Btckenfdrde's distinc-
tion between material justification and the formal justification; do you dismiss this
as a technicality? Nonetheless, maybe all of this is just on the surface, and maybe
you are fundamentally right that what the majority is really doing is acting on an
unstated rejection in principle of the "social" indication for abortion. If that is
true, however, then my own reaction would be that the initial denunciations of
the decisions were correct, and I would think at least that praise for the decision
would require some explanation of why socially indicated abortions can never be
as justifiable as eugenic abortions.
117. Two of the justices in the majority, incidentally, were Social Democrats, one of
whom was a woman.
118. BVerfGG, § 31(2).
119. As of this writing, parliament has not amended the Pregnancy and Family Assist-
ance Act of 1992. Several bills designed to incorporate the Court's rulings, however, are
now pending before the Bundestag. See FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 19 Janu-
ary, 1994, at 1.
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IV.
Does the German experience have any relevance for Americans?
Many would resist the suggestion that we Americans could or should
transplant German constitutional doctrine onto American soil. There are
notable differences in our political and legal landscapes that would make
wholesale transplantation in either direction difficult, just as there are
crucial differences in the roles played by, the two high courts when exer-
cising judicial review. On the other hand, to suggest that the German
experience has no relevance for us is to take refuge in a mindless and
debilitating relativism.
Most commentaries on the German and American abortion decisions
emphasize their doctrinal differences. An important similarity, however,
tends to be overlooked. Each tribunal seems to employ a "compelling
interest" and "narrow tailoring" analysis, a common analytical frame-
work known as "proportionality" analysis in Germany and "strict scru-
tiny" analysis in the United States. The difference of course is that in
Germany the protection of the fetus was found to be a compelling state
interest - indeed a compelling interest commanded by the Constitution
itself. Under the German Court's brand of strict scrutiny review, the
Abortion Reform Act of 1992 was not adequately tailored to protect the
state's compelling interest in preserving unborn life.
One general issue in the background of the German and American
cases, is the way in which the tension between judicial review and legisla-
tive majoritarianism has been played out in both countries. For example,
we have already seen how the dissenting justices on both Courts rebuked
their colleagues for exceeding the limits of judicial power. Yet there are
important differences between the American and German cases. In Ger-
many, judicial review extended to a national statute; in the United States,
to a variety of state laws. In addition, at least in the beginning, the two
situations represented different variants of judicial activism. In Roe v.
Wade, the laws struck down had been on the books for generations and
were kept there through legislative inertia without regard to intervening
social change.12 In Germany, the Court struck down new laws which
had been laboriously forged out of serious discussion, debate and
negotiation.
What bothers the critics of the German abortion decision is that the
parliamentary debate represented an honest effort on the part of consci-
120. The United States Supreme Court has also struck down a variety of "new" laws on
abortion, but nearly all of these statutes were passed in response to Roe v. Wade.
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entious legislators to balance the life of the fetus with the welfare of preg-
nant women. Nullifying the result of such a thoughtful legislative effort,
as John Ely has suggested,' 2 ' would seem to strike deeply into the heart
of a political democracy. The suggestion is that a constitutional court
ought to stay its hand when an unbiased and fairminded legislature has
made a sincere effort to balance constitutional rights and values. In de-
fending the power of judicial review, American constitutional theorists
often resort to functional explanations. They argue that the Court must
reserve to itself the power of decision because, unlike the legislature, it is
a principled decisionmaker unaffected by the kind of constituency pres-
sures that buffet lawmakers.'
22
Functional theory would not seem fully to describe the situation in
Germany. Only a cynic would suggest that the Abortion Reform Act of
1992 proceeded from the short-term objectives of constituency interests
or pressure groups. Yes, interest groups pressed their demands - as is
their right, incidentally, in any political system we would wish to call dem-
ocratic - and they had notable representation in the Bundestag, but the
parliamentary result was significantly more than the sum total of these
pressures. Important public values were at stake and these values were
often at the center of the legislative debate. Abstract principles were in-
voked by all sides in the debate and a conscious effort was made to define
a national policy on abortion arguably compatible with the Federal Con-
stitutional Court's abortion decision of 1975. In many respects, the
Bundestag had entered into a conversation with the Constitutional Court,
furnishing Americans with an example of creative dialogue across
branches of government. Roe v. Wade, by contrast, stopped the conversa-
tion. It ended the debate over the constitutionality of abortion and on
the basis of constitutional language less explicit or commanding than the
text of the Basic Law.' 23 Except for the abortion funding cases, 124 Roe
and its progeny over the next ten years or so left the states with no real
discretion to control the incidence of abortion in American society. The
121. JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
122. For a prominent example of functional justification, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE
CONsTrrTTON, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 83-87 (1989).
123. Susan Burgess takes a slightly different view, arguing that Congress and the
Supreme Court engaged in a substantive constitutional debate over abortion. See SUSAN
R. BURGESS, CONTEST. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE ABORTION AND WAR
PowERs DEBATES 28-64 (1992).
124. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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lack of discretion was one consequence of dividing pregnancy into three
stages and attaching rather firm constitutional rules to each. In 1975 and
1993, by contrast, the Federal Constitutional Court bounced the ball back
to parliament, thus continuing the dialogue that had begun there. In do-
ing so, the Court challenged the representatives of the people to use their
intellects and imaginations to write better laws. In Casey, the Supreme
Court finally rejected Roe's trimester framework of analysis, but it re-
mains to be seen how much discretion Casey has given back to the Amer-
ican states.
It is possible of course to exaggerate the degree of discretion the Ger-
man Court has left to parliament in devising a new abortion law in the
aftermath of its 1993 decision. The numerous instructions and guidelines
laid down by the Court and which parliament must now follow in enact-
ing a new law are not less "statutory" in nature than the trimester frame-
work laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. So perhaps
the dialogue between judiciary and legislature will not be as fruitful as
one would hope for. On the other hand, Casey may well represent the
beginning of an American dialogue, particularly if the centrist position of
Justices Souter, Kennedy, and O'Connor gather support in the American
political and judicial communities.125 Ironically, a decision to overrule
Roe v. Wade would remove the judiciary from the dialogue and, perhaps
as a consequence, provide less protection to pregnant women than the
decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court.
Perhaps this comparison is limited because of the very different ways in
which the debate over abortion has taken shape in Germany and the
United States, a difference that emerges in both legislative and judicial
arenas. In Germany, the main contestants did not question the state's
duty to protect the life of the fetus at all stages of pregnancy. On this
question, the most non-religious Social Democrat could agree with the
most religious Christian Democrat. However, such agreement has been
largely absent from the American debate. Perhaps when disagreement is
over strategy rather than ends, there should be greater judicial reluctance
to negate the judgment of the legislature. 26
How Americans assess the performance of Germany's Federal Consti-
125. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Souter, Kennedy, O'Connor,JJ.).
126. Perhaps the opposite contention could be made with equal force. When the judici-
ary and the legislature disagree about ends (i.e., when there is no societal consensus about
the morality or propriety of abortion), the judiciary should be advised to stay its hand so as
to avoid the imposition of a single constitutional theory on the nation as a whole.
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tutional Court probably depends on their own personal views about the
morality or propriety of abortion. But surely we Americans must envy
the relative civility and integrity of the German debate in both legislative
and judicial arenas. We have witnessed there a conversation, one that has
sought to build bridges between people of opposing views rather than to
burn them. German lawmakers, however, like the members of the Con-
stitutional Court, have been able to talk with one another, and they seem
to be making an effort to achieve a genuine consensus about what it
means to create a society based on common values about life and human
dignity. Many American legislators, by contrast, appear to be arming for
battle in an effort to "exterminate" the enemy and to achieve total vic-
tory for one side or the other'
One also sees in the German approach a refreshing honesty that owns
up to the realities of abortion. There is no pretending that a five month
old fetus is not in some sense human life. There is no pretending that all
doctors working in abortion clinics have the best interests of their pa-
tients at heart. There is no pretending that all women who choose to
abort their unborn children are doing so because they have made a re-
sponsible choice against the backdrop of all available alternatives. What
is impressive about the German Court's performance is its appreciation
of the complexity of these issues and its detailed discussion of the many
pressures and cross-pressures confronting a pregnant woman in distress.
The Justices invited and engaged in argument on all aspects of the abor-
tion process.
The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, by contrast, ignored issues
and glossed over problems that were crucial to the Constitutional Court.
For example, the attitude of the Supreme Court toward the medical pro-
fession was one of almost total trust. In Doe v. Bolton, the Court noted
that the physician's license runs not only to making "the best clinical
judgment that an abortion is necessary," '127 but also to rendering a medi-
cal judgment "exercised in the light of all factors - physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman's age - relevant to the well-being
of the patient.' 128 The German Court declined to cede any such all-em-
bracing role to physicians, in part because they are arguably incompetent
to advise patients on the nonmedical aspects of abortion. Indeed, the
Constitutional Court suggested that to the extent that physicians have
127. 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
128. Id. For a critical treatment of this comment on the physician's role, see Susan F.
Appleton, Doctor, Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician's
Role in 'Private' Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 183 (1985).
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contributed to the commercialization of abortion they are themselves
part of the problem. Given the Supreme Court's extreme deference to
the expertise of the medical profession, no American should be surprised
that the commercialization of abortion services, banned or curtailed in
some western European nations with liberal abortion policies,' 29 has pro-
liferated in the United States. On the other hand, American state gov-
ernments could probably cut down on commercialized abortion facilities
if, like a number of European nations, they were to provide women with
the kind of social and financial assistance that would make it easier for
them to carry their pregnancies to term.
Profound differences also mark the way in which the two tribunals
characterized the human fetus. The question in Roe was whether the fe-
tus is a person within the meaning of the Constitution. Putting the ques-
tion that way was bound to result in a total victory for the pregnant
woman. With the fetus categorically declared as a nonperson, all other
countervailing social values had to give way to the woman's right to pri-
vacy. For the German Court, the personhood of the fetus was not the
issue. The Constitutional Court did not have to decide, indeed it refused
to decide, whether the unborn child was a bearer of rights. Throughout
its opinion the Court described the fetus not as a person but rather as
"gestating life," "unborn life," and so on, and characterized that life as a
"legal value" of utmost importance, thus meriting the state's protection.
It was enough for the Court to posit that human life has significant value
even if that life has not yet developed into a full person.
Because fetal life represents an important legal value, the German
Court was able to avoid the pitfalls of treating abortion as a right of pri-
vacy. Roe v. Wade did not convincingly argue that abortion is strictly a
private matter between a woman and her doctor. The very idea of fetal
life as a public legal value undercuts the privacy argument. Let us not
forget. that even Justice Blackmun distinguished abortion from the pri-
vacy right discovered in Griswold v. Connecticut,130 and he went on to
observe in Roe, with a touch of uneasiness, that "[t]he pregnant woman
cannot be isolated in her privacy.' 131 Why? Because, the Justice contin-
ued, "[s]he carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medi-
cal definition of the developing young in the human uterus.' 1 2 But,
129. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 17 (1987).
130. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
131. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159.
132. Id.
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Justice Blackmun backed off, and with a bit of verbal legerdemain,
brought Roe once again within the scope of Griswold.
The different approaches to constitutional interpretation in Germany
and the United States have to be understood finally in terms of the un-
derlying ethos that drives constitutional doctrine. In the U.S. that ethos is
anti-statist individualism. The image of the human person in American
constitutional law is that of an autonomous moral agent unconnected to
the larger community in any meaningful sense. It is the image of a wo-
man alone, isolated and independent, and bounded by little more than
self-interest. German constitutional law, by contrast, has a strong com-
munitarian orientation, and it tells the story of human solidarity, a story
that tries to join public virtue to liberty, one that speaks of social integra-
tion and the wholeness of life. As the Court has said in another context:
The image of man in the Basic Law is not that of an isolated,
sovereign individual; rather, the Basic Law has decided in favor
of a relationship between individual and community in the sense
of a person's dependence on and commitment to the commu-
nity, without infringing upon a person's individual value.'
33
Perhaps there is some instruction in all of this for how we Americans
might better resolve the tension between liberty and community.
Earlier, I characterized the German abortion opinion as a conversa-
tion. I would like to return to this metaphor in these concluding com-
ments. In describing the German debate as a conversation, I have in
mind particularly the two days of hearings before the Second Senate of
the Federal Constitutional Court. The hearings transcended the dualism
of the standard pro and con arguments so often heard in American
courts. The German justices listened patiently for two days to all kinds of
people, lawyers and nonlawyers alike. They invited and heard the merits
of all competing claims. Doctors, counselors, social workers, women's or-
ganizations and charitable societies had an opportunity to inform the
Court about the difficulties and procedures faced by pregnant women in
distress. Perhaps this is one of the advantages of abstract judicial review;
as indicated earlier, the object is not to define the rights of particular
parties but to declare the meaning of the Constitution. Abstract review
facilitates conversation and helps to avoid the kind of polarization pres-
ent in the American legal order. The Court helps to build bridges when it
honors the competing values on both sides of the abortion debate and
acknowledges the various interests of persons with different outlooks.
133. 4 BVerfGE 7 at 15-16 (1954).
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Our courts, by contrast, too often engage in the zero-sum game of pro-
ducing winners and losers.'3
I think the German experience shows that compromise is possible and
that a balancing of interests superior to the balance struck in Roe is
within our grasp.'35 Germany is engaged in an exciting experiment and
Americans would do well to follow developments there to see how the
system works out in practice. Our courts would also be well advised to
pay attention to the German experiment. Obviously, we Americans have
no judicially enforceable objective order of values, but it seems to me that
our courts might begin to permit what the Federal Constitutional Court
requires. If counseling programs, waiting periods, mandated information
about fetal development and the like are carried out within a genuine
context of public caring and solicitude, there may be reason to think that
the abortion battle would begin to play itself out. I could even envision
an acceptance of public funding for poor women if they opt to abort
within the framework of a system similar to the German. In this respect,
Casey may just possibly be a step forward; it could be the key to a new
American settlement regarding abortion in our society.
134. Robert A. Burt advances a similar view in his insightful comparison of Dred Scott
v. Sandford and Brown v. Board of Education. See Robert A. Burt, What Was Wrong With
Dred Scott, What's Right About Brown, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1985). Speaking of
Dred Scott, Burt notes: "The question purported to settle the antagonism [on the slavery
question] by awarding total victory to one side and, concomitantly, by inflicting total defeat
on the other." Id. at 19.
135. See Generally ELIZABETH MENSCH AND ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF VIR-
TUE (1993).
